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Abstract 
 
We compute the value of fiscal multipliers (for government primary expenditure, Income 
and wealth taxes and for Production and import ones) in the Eurozone countries since the 
creation of the currency union (2001Q1-2016Q4), and to understand how the values may 
vary according to the public debt level, the rhythm of economic growth and the output 
gap. Imposing quarterly fiscal shocks in the period 2000-2016, the results shown that the 
government expenditure had a positive effect on output, with an annual accumulated 
multiplier of 0.64 while the tax multipliers presented negative signs - the Income and 
wealth and the Production and import taxes stood at -0.10 and -0.32, respectively. 
Furthermore, the multipliers shown higher values for countries with higher levels of 
public debt (to small levels, the expenditure multiplier is close to zero and the tax 
multipliers seem to have positive signs), during recessions, and in countries with positive 
output gaps. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the definition given by Spilimbergo et al. (2009), the fiscal multipliers (or 
Keynesian’s multipliers) can be defined as the ratio of a change in output to a unitary 
exogenous change in the fiscal balance, which could be driven by a change in government 
expenditure or tax revenue. This effect assumes that, according to the Keynesian theory, 
an increase in fiscal balance stimulates the level of domestic consumption, GDP and the 
State’s revenue, generating a cyclical dynamic. In turn, given an improvement in the 
budget balance, a recessive impact on economic activity might be expected. 
In Brinca et al. (2016), is explained that the last Great Recession has brought the 
multipliers behave and, consequently, the effectiveness of fiscal policy, and its variation 
depending on the time and space factors, into debate in the economic research literature. 
When the crisis emerged, many countries took expansionist fiscal measures to stimulate 
their economies, hoping to generate impacts on demand and limiting job losses (Born et 
al., 2013; Zubairy, 2010). Nevertheless, the impact of the crisis on the multiplier’s values 
seemed to be uncertain, especially on the relative stabilizing effects provided by the 
variation on government spending and tax cuts (Ilzetzki et al., 2011; Zubairy, 2010; 
Spilimbergo et al., 2009). Firstly, the uncertainty and mistrust in the economy appears to 
have increased precautionary savings, reducing the marginal propensity to consume and 
consequently, the size of multipliers. However, in the opposite side, the deleveraging 
process increased the number of liquidity-constrained agents and the accommodative 
behave of monetary institutions (with the short rates close to zero) which may have a 
positive impact on multipliers. Thus, without clear stabilizing effects, when the financial 
crises became a sovereign debt crisis, there was a shift from expansionary policies to 
austerity ones. 
According to the traditional analysis based on Mundell-Fleming model, the fiscal 
multiplier is predicted to be close to zero in economies with floating exchange rates 
(government spending would generate pressure on interest rates, diminishing the net 
exports due to the currency appreciation and the increase of money demand, and 
offsetting the government spending effect), but larger in economies which are part of a 
currency union. Furthermore, the EMU countries were subjected to large fiscal 
adjustments, where the magnitude of the fiscal multipliers deserves a special attention 
(Born et al., 2013).  Because of those reasons, the following research will be focus in the 
Eurozone countries since the creation of the currency union. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 presents 
the methodology and the data. Section 4 reports the empirical analysis. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
 
2.1. Theoretical Perspectives 
In Samuelson and Nordhaus (2010), the fiscal policy is described as a set of decisions or 
rules related to taxes, to government expenditure, and to the allocation of resources’ 
decision concerning the public and private sector, in order to influence people's incomes 
and consumption, and provide incentives for economic decisions. However, the need of 
State intervention in the economic activity is not consensual. There are three core schools 
of thought concerning the budget deficits -the Neoclassical, the Keynesian and the 
Ricardian-, which will be briefly presented in the following sub-sections. 
2.1.1. Neoclassical Perspective 
The Neoclassical perspective assumes that economic agents will plan their consumption 
level over their life cycle, where fiscal deficits might change their projections, shifting 
costs to future generations. This theory is based on three central features: i) the 
consumption level must be determined through an individual intertemporal optimization 
problem, from where should be generated a market’s interest rate; ii) agents have finite 
lifespans; and iii) market clearing is assumed in all periods (Bernheim, 1989). 
In this context, as argued in Bernheim (1989), a positive consumption shock is expected 
to lead to a decrease in savings, an interest rate’s stimulus, and consequently, to crowding 
out private capital accumulation. Moreover, according to Diamond (1965), the 
accumulation of public debt might depress the capital-labor ratio, since the rise of interest 
rates will stimulate additional savings and inhibit new investments.  
Diamond (1965) also defends that the effect of temporary deficits on the economic 
activity is expected to be small and perverse, changing the agent’s decisions. Since 
households plan their consumption level in a long-term horizon, a marginal increment on 
their wealth level is supposed to generate a limited impact on current consumption. If the 
fiscal stimulus were generated through a tax decrease, the result is expected (by the 
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author) to be close to its counterfactual, where a decrease in capital tax level would 
stimulate savings (due to a higher rate of return), and a decrease in labor income might 
induce an intertemporal substitution, leading to the same result (stimulates savings). 
Also, Neoclassicists tends to focus on a cumulative deficit impact over a temporal interval 
rather than a year-on-year approach, defending that with a lower permanent deficit, is 
possible to achieve the same degree of stabilization of countercyclical fiscal policies 
(which intends to manipulate temporary shock to stabilize fluctuations around the full 
employment equilibrium), gravitating toward an equilibrium without accumulate high 
levels of public debt (Bernheim, 1989). 
2.1.2. Keynesian Perspective 
In the Keynesian perspective, is assumed that a share of economic resources is 
unemployed, and that a certain fraction of the population is liquidity constraint or 
economically myopic. Then, since that this kind of agents are expected to have a higher 
propensity to consume, a change on their income or taxes should have a significant impact 
on aggregate demand, leading consequently to second round effects:  the so-called 
Keynesian multipliers. As those policies stimulates both national consumption and 
income, would not be perceived a hypothetical effect on savings neither on capital 
accumulation (Bernheim, 1989).  Following this perspective, the size of government 
spending should vary over the business cycle, being more needed and effective during 
recessions than expansions, enhancing the need of policy activism to stimulate output 
during a deep recession. (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). 
As demonstrated in the Hicks-Hansen model (IS-LM), expansionist fiscal policies raise 
the demand for money, which may request a synchronization with monetary 
policymakers. If the money supply is flexible, the maintenance of interest rates might 
avoid an offset of fiscal multipliers. In addition, that intuition caused by interest rates 
doesn’t seems to be so linear, since some authors supported the existence of a crowding-
in effect on private investment provided by public ones, through the positive impact of 
public infrastructures on private investment productivity (Argimón et al, 1997). 
However, the Neoclassicals economists appears to be very critics about this perspective, 
neglecting the importance of fiscal policy to mitigate market failures. As argued in Lucas 
(1973), government policies just use to make up market failures (as the unemployment), 
despite the effects of those troubles will remain fixed. In addition, they are sceptics about 
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the possibility that policy makers would apply contractionary measures, to promote 
counter-cyclical policies in order to mitigate cyclical fluctuations. Otherwise, once close 
to full employment, real deficits will crowd out private expenditure and inflationary 
pressures will emerge (Bernheim, 1989). 
As argued by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the neoclassical theory differs from the 
Keynesian one mainly in what concerns to government spending, since in several 
occasions, private consumption and GDP increased simultaneously with a decrease in 
government spending (non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy). Whilst in the neoclassical 
model, a shock in government spending can raise private investment only if the shock is 
sufficiently persistent and taxes are sufficiently non-distortionary (the investment may 
fall otherwise), in a Keynesian model, investment increases if the accelerator effect 
prevails, and falls if the effect of a higher interest rate prevails.  
2.1.3. Ricardian Perspective 
Finally, as argued by Bernheim (1989), the Ricardian theory defends the existence of an 
inter-generational altruistic transfer system, where the consumption level is determined 
according to agent’s resources and his descendants (dynastic resources function). This 
perspective predicts that fiscal deficits just shift its payment to future generations, and 
households will increase their savings, to match the present discounted values of future 
taxes and expenditures, avoiding effects to their children. Thus, the fiscal shock will have 
no real effects in economic activity.  
However, this theory isn’t so imminent in the economic literature, since it’s based on 
strong assumptions, as: i) generations are linked through altruistic behaves; ii) consumers 
are rational and provident; iii) taxes are non-distortionary; iv) capital markets are perfect; 
v) there is no redistribution among families; and vi) government expenditure isn’t able to 
generate value. Moreover, the amounts of transfers may depend on economic growth, the 
ratio of parents to children and the ratio of their wealth may vary across the population, 
and the agents doesn’t know about their future income, what shows a lack of quantitative 
and empirical analysis regarding this perspective. 
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2.2. Fiscal Multipliers 
 2.2.1. Transmission Channels 
In Brinca et al. (2016) it is shown that one of the main transmission channel between the 
fiscal policy and the economic activity, and consequently an important determinant of the 
value of fiscal multipliers, is the level of liquidity-constrained agents in the economy. 
When the constraints are higher, the marginal propensity to consume will increase making 
the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier also higher. In addition, high interest rates, 
increasing the net present value of the fiscal shock, may also be a liquidity factor that 
boost the value of multipliers. 
Regarding the tax policy, Zubairy (2010) demonstrated that a decrease of 1 p.p. on labor 
taxes increases the output, the number of hours worked, the consumption and investment 
level. There is also a positive wealth effect generated by consumption, with an intra-
temporal substitution effect leading consume and labor to rise due to the higher return of 
labor. The investment level is expected to increase due to the rise on capital return and its 
effects on labor supply.  
If the decrease is on capital taxes, that would also result in more hours worked and a 
wage’s rise. The after-tax return on capital might goes up, increasing the investment, and 
the intertemporal substitution would lead to a delay in consumption and to a raise in labor 
supply. The effect on consumption and labor on the equilibrium is not linear because soon 
the labor tax revenue will increase to pay the deficit incurred (Zubairy, 2010).  
About the progressivity of the tax system, the reduction of wage inequality (as variation 
in permanent ability) appears to have a limited impact on the value of the multiplier, 
which, given the relevance of the fiscal system to the inequality of an economy, may raise 
doubts about its effectiveness. According to Brinca et al. (2016), a more progressive 
system may reduce the multiplier by reducing restrictions on credit, but it may also 
increase its value through a lower holding of assets and its impact on interest rates (less 
savings leads to higher interests). According to their results, countries with high wealth 
inequality have a significant positive response to an increase in government spending 
with a delay of two years, in opposite of what occurs in the more equal countries. In 
addition, the results also showed that the impact of fiscal measures sharply increases in 
response to a decrease in the capital / output ratio. They defend that when the tax levels 
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go up, the economy becomes poorer, with less capital, the interest rate increase and the 
wage rate decrease.  
On the expenditure side, given an increase on public spending, the increase in demand 
will give to firms an incentive to reduce their markups to hook larger customer bases 
(Zubairy, 2010). This shift on markups might increase the labor demand, the wages and 
the output. Higher wages may lead the households to substitute leisure for consumption, 
offsetting the negative impact on wealth. In addition, there would be an expected increase 
on interest rate, and the intertemporal substitution effect (which have a negative impact 
on consumption) is supposed to be too small to decrease the consumption level. However, 
in a situation when the government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes, households 
would face a decreasing on wealth that consequently will generate an impact on 
consumption and in the number of hours worked.  
According to Barrel et al (2012), one of the most affective aspects related to fiscal 
multipliers is the role of expectations. For example, government spending shocks use to 
generate pure sentiment effects, providing a stimulus for future changes in output 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). Those kind of reactions affects the long-run 
interest rates, prices, exchange rates, salaries and inflation. Barrel’s et al (2012) article 
points to a higher size of multipliers when the consumers are myopic. If consumers are 
forward looking, they will react to the expected values of future wealth. Then, they expect 
lower taxes in the future, making the consumption level higher than otherwise. If myopia 
premium shrinks to zero, the model comes close to a fully Ricardian model. 
As argued by Zubairy (2010), the monetary policy is also crucial to determining the 
movements of interest rates, which plays a role in how the economy react to fiscal shocks. 
A higher nominal interest rate increases the spending and capital tax multipliers while the 
labor tax multiplier falls. The first two multiplier’s cases can be explained since a higher 
value on nominal interest rate means that the monetary policy makers increased their real 
rates less rapidly, increasing the expansionary effects of fiscal measures. Although the 
inflation has a limited response to fiscal shock, if it increases, the largest effect occurs on 
labor tax multiplier with a negative sign. Labor tax cut lead households to increase labor 
supply, generating a fall in wages and lower marginal costs results in a fall in inflation. 
Also, the fiscal expansions would be stronger if the monetary conditions were 
accommodative, i.e., if the nominal interest rate does not increase with a fiscal expansion 
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(not generating a crowding out of investment and consumption); if the exchange rate is 
fixed; and if the county’s fiscal position after the stimulus is sustainable, where it will 
reduce the effects that the higher debt has on interest rates (Spilimbergo et al, 2009). 
 2.2.2. Determinants of Fiscal Multipliers 
As defended by many authors (e.g. Zubairy, 2010 and Boussard et al, 2012), there is a 
nonlinearity of multipliers facing different types of measures, conditions and according 
their funding source. According to Boussard et al (2012), the main factors affecting the 
multipliers can be grouped as: i) Factors that lead households to base their consumption 
level on the current income (financial frictions); ii) the nature of the fiscal shock 
(credibility and duration); iii) composition of the fiscal shock; iv) structural features of 
each economy; v) monetary policies; and vi) exchange rate regime and the openness of 
the economy.  
Ilzetski et al (2011), assessing the determinants of the value of fiscal multipliers, both in 
high-income and developing countries, realized that the value depends on the level of 
development of each country, where developing countries use to have higher multipliers 
than high-income ones, although negative at first moment and with a less persistent effect.  
About their debt level, the result showed that with a range of sovereign debts over 60 % 
GDP, the multipliers became no statistically different from zero, and the fiscal stimulus 
may have a negative impact on the long-run output.  
According to the literature, the action of fiscal multipliers is larger if leakages are few 
(i.e., the stimulus generates less changes in savings or spent on imports). In addition to 
the liquidity constrains and wealth inequality issues, Spilimbergo et al (2009) also argued 
that the multipliers are maximized if the households have non-Ricardian behaviors, if the 
propensity to import is small (related to the dimension and openness of each economy), 
if the automatic stabilizers are small, and if the output gap is large, although when the 
unemployment is very low, the fiscal policy has limited overall effects. 
The openness level also plays a role, where closed economies have long-run multipliers 
over the unity, while open economies can have negative multipliers on the short and long 
run. There are two reasons behind that: because a county with a low trade level may has 
high tariffs or barriers to trade, or because his economy is too large, despite his eventually 
high level of trade (the openness level is a relative indicator). Both factors may affect the 
magnitude of the multiplier independently (Ilzetski et al, 2011) because according to 
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Barrel et al (2012), the shock use to sped into other economies through trade market, 
where the degree of dependence of consumption on current income, and the speed of 
response (labor market flexibility) are crucial factors. Nevertheless, regarding the 
exchange rate regime, the capital mobility may accommodate the exchange rate in order 
to maintain the rate in parity. Also, an open economy uses to have smaller expending 
multipliers than tax-based because it cannot adjust the exchange rate. Thus, the higher the 
degree of openness of an economy, the lower multiplier is expected (Boussard et al, 
2012).  
According to Ilzetski et al (2011), countries under predetermined exchange rate regimes 
use to have long-run multipliers higher than 1 (note that under currency union, if the 
private demand rises along with the public demand, assuming that the net exports will 
remain unchanged, the multiplier will exceed the unity (Born et al, 2013)). Under flexible 
exchange rate, the multipliers are close to zero. The differences between responses to 
fiscal shocks are related with the degree of monetary accommodation. The results are 
consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model, and its results about the efficacy of fiscal 
policy.  In Zubairy (2010) is argued that responses of monetary policy makers to shift the 
output from the steady state are important to determining movements on interest rates, 
which limits the impact of spending shocks. An accommodative policy is powerful to 
increase the impact of this kind of shock, however, less responsive monetary policy does 
not imply a larger simulative effect with all types of measures, where the case of labor 
tax cuts may be an example of the opposite. 
On monetary policy rules and speed of action, Barrel et al (2012) studied the differences 
between when there is a monetary action in the first year, and the scenario where the 
interest rate is fixed in the first year. A faster response will reduce the fiscal multiplier in 
the first three years but raises the values in the subsequent ones. They also compare 
different monetary rules (two-pillar, price level target and Taylor rule), where Taylor 
multipliers are higher than price level ones, and both are higher than the two-pillar. 
Finally, they realized that at the zero lower bound, interest rates cannot fall, and then the 
output might fall 0.1 p.p. more than in the counterfactual scenario. 
In Barrel et al (2012) it could be also found a 40-55% correlation (positive) between the 
country size and the multipliers, once a large economy is less open to imports than smaller 
economies in spite of the bigger impact on interest rates.  
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About the persistence of the measures, while temporary reductions in income taxes 
decrease the mistrust about the fiscal sustainability, with impact on risk premium (but use 
to have a small effect on consumption - forward looking perspective), temporary 
measures that trigger intertemporal reallocation (e.g. decrease on investment tax credits 
for firms), can have powerful effects. In addition, permanent measures generate higher 
multipliers than temporary ones when focused on income, while the reverse is truth when 
the measures are focused on prices (Spilimbergo et al, 2009). Overall, permanent 
multipliers are smaller than temporary ones, as they have a higher impact on long-term 
rates, generating consequently an increase in asset prices and investment (Barrel et al, 
2012).  
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) points the difference of the values between an 
expansion and a recession. The result predicts a bigger multiplier in recession (close to 
two) than in an expansion (close to zero).  It can be justified arguing that the value of the 
multiplier may be higher because the government spending might be simultaneous with 
the economic recovery. In addition, the impact of government spending on total 
employment seems to be higher during recessions (particularly in private sector 
employment). However, the expenditure shock might stimulate inflation during 
expansions and generate deflationary responses during recessions.  
Measuring the rigidity of labor market (using an index of protection of labor relations and 
another for labor market regulation), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) found that 
output responses during recessions increases when the rigidity in labor market is higher, 
which is consistent with the view that labor rigidity enhances the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy during recessions. 
Corroborating with those perspectives, Riera-Crichtion et al (2014) studying OECD 
countries, argued that while in recessions the spending multiplier is 0.73, during 
expansions the value stands in 0.09 (and not significantly different from zero). Under 
countercyclical policies, during a boom the value is smaller because the reduction in 
government spending is offset by increases in consumption and net exports, and it would 
reduce inflationary pressures. On the other hand, in a recession, it has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on output, once there would be an increase in consumption 
and investment since net exports and inflation tend to decrease (consistent with the 
Keynesian theory). 
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However, Riera-Crichtion et al (2014) also realized that in many cases (44%) is observed 
pro-cyclical policy measures (related to public expenditure) rather than countercyclical 
ones. Since the economic response does not seem to be symmetric for both types of 
policies, the authors found evidences that in recessionary periods, the log-run fiscal 
multiplier can achieve the value of 2.3. Thus, computing the value of multipliers 
depending on the phase of business cycle and the type of policy adopted, they found that 
when there is a: i) decrease in government spending during an expansion: the multiplier 
is not different from zero at any horizon; ii) increase in government spending during an 
expansion: the multiplier is 1.13 (1.25 after 2 years); iii) decrease in government spending 
in a recession: 0.76; and iv) increase in government spending during a recession: 0.68 
(2.28 after 2 years). 
More than the orientation of fiscal policy, the value of fiscal multipliers also depends on 
the relation between the fiscal mechanism used and the reaction of the private sector. In 
this context, there seems to exist in the literature a crowding-in/crowding-out pattern 
effect of government spending and taxation. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argued that 
private consumption is crowded out by taxation, and crowded in by government spending, 
which is difficult to reconcile with a neoclassical model and is consistent with a 
Keynesian model. On the opposite side, private investment is crowd out by both 
government spending and taxation, which implies a strong negative effect on private 
investment of a fiscal expansion, which is consistent with a neoclassical model. The root 
of this difference is based on the responses of investment to an increase on expenditure, 
which depends on the relative strength of the effects preceded from an increase both in 
output and interest rate, although in either theories increases in spending and taxes have 
opposite effects on investment. In Boussard et al (2012) it’s argued that fiscal shocks lead 
to crowding-out effects (due to the interest rates) and to a fiscal multiplier above 1, but if 
the stimulus is large enough, the multiplier can be close to 1, since the marginal product 
of capital and the investment compensates the decrease on consumption. 
The choose between government spending or tax cuts was studied by Barrel et al (2012) 
that said that multipliers generated by income taxes and benefit adjustments are small, 
since it may be offset by a temporary change in savings rate. The opposite occurs in 
spending cuts, where might be expected an impact on unemployment and on goods and 
services bought. Also, in Boussard et al (2012), is argued that usually, short-term 
multipliers are higher for expenditure shocks than for tax shocks, and because of that, is 
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argued that there is a fundamental trade-off between short-run pain and long-term gain. 
That issue can be increased by price rigidities, once firms can easily respond to shocks in 
aggregate demand by changing the output than changing the prices. 
The importance of the monetary policy managing the reaction of interest rates is shown 
in Leeper et al (2011) where the expected inflation in the Taylor Rule can explain about 
10% of impact multipliers. The Keynesian liquidity trap can be crucial, once if the 
nominal interest rates remains at zero lower bound, it should increase the spending 
multiplier to values well above 1. 
The financial market development has an ambiguous effect on multipliers, depending on 
his effects on the level of liquidity constraints and the government’s fiscal ability to 
finance his deficits (Spilimbergo et al, 2009), and the financial sector stress seems to have 
an insignificant effect (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).  
2.2.3. The Value of Fiscal Multipliers 
In this sub-section we present a summary table of some of the principal literature 
contributions regarding the value of fiscal multipliers, both in short and long term, 
showing the differences of results depending on the methodology applied, the sample 
used, that type and signal of the shock, and other specific characteristics above discussed. 
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Table 1 – Multiplier’s values in the literature 
 
Article Sample Period Method Shock Signal Control Factor
Impact 
Multiplier
Cumulative 
Multiplier
: : 0.31 0.40
: Expansion 0.09 0.09
: Recession 0.73 1.25
:
Extreme 
Expansion
≈0 ≈0
:
Extreme 
Recession
1.25 2.08
+ : 0.49 1.36
- : ≈0 ≈0
+ Expansion 1.13 1.25
- Expansion ≈0 ≈0
+ Recession 0.68 2.28
- Recession 0.76 0.79
SVAR + : : 0.31
Direct Projections + : : 0.46
Direct Projections (FE) + Expansion :  -0.20
Direct Projections (FE) + Recession : 0.46
Government 
Consumption
-
Temporary 
Innovations
 -0.63 :
Indirect Taxes +
Temporary 
Innovations
-0,09 :
Direct Taxes +
Temporary 
Innovations
-0,14 :
Government 
Consumption
-
Permanent 
Consolidation
-0,58 :
Indirect Taxes +
Permanent 
Consolidation
-0,08 :
Direct Taxes +
Permanent 
Consolidation
-0,12 :
+
Fixed Exchange 
Rate
1.25 1.00
+
Floating 
Exchange Rate
0.45 0.55
+ High-Income 0.37 0.80
+ Developing  -0.21 0.18
+
Predetermined 
Exchange Rate
0.09 1.50
+
Flexible 
Exhange Rate
 -0.30 ≈0
+ Open Econ. 0.02 1.29
+ Closed Econ.  -0.28  -0.75
+ High Debt ≈0  -2.30
+ High-Income 0.41 1.15
+ Developing 0.57 0.75
Government 
Expenditure
+ : 1.12 0.85
Labor Tax - : 0.13 0.34
Capital Tax - : 0.33 0.36
Government 
Expenditure
+ : 0.84 1.29
Taxes + :  -0.69  -0.78
Riera-Crichton, Vegh and Vuletin 
(2014)
OECD
LSDV (linear local 
projections)
1986-2008
Born, Jüben and Müller (2012) OECD 1985-2011 SVAR
20 High-
income
24 
Developing
1960-2007 SVAR
OECD
Barrel et al (2012) OECD 2010-2012 NiGEM
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) USA 1960-1997 SVAR
Government 
Expenditure
Government 
Expenditure
Government 
Expenditure
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) 1985-2008
DSGE1958-2008USAZubairy (2010) 
Government 
Investment
Government 
Expenditure
Ilzetzki et al (2011) 
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3. Methodology and Data 
As argued by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the VAR approach may be one of the best-
suited methods for the study of fiscal policy (contrary to monetary policy), for two 
reasons. First, fiscal variables move for several causes, including many exogenous (with 
respect to output) fiscal shocks. Second, decision and implementation lags in fiscal policy 
imply that, at high enough frequency, there is a little or no discretionary response of fiscal 
policy to unexpected contemporaneous movements in activity. 
In order to assess the value of the multipliers from a shock in primary government 
expenditure and in tax revenue, distinguishing the taxes on Income and wealth and on 
Production and imports. All variables are presented in real terms, per capita, logarithms 
and, in exception to GDP, the variables are presented in differences to respect the unit 
root test. The estimation of the fiscal multiplier was based on the reduced-form VAR 
model with 4 lags (which verifies the stability condition): 
A(L) = .       (1) 
Here,  denotes a vector containing the output and the fiscal variables, A(L) is an 
autoregressive lag polynomial and  represents a correlated error term. Then, the 
structural uncorrelated shocks 	 were computed. 
Thus, a SVAR model was designed using a recursive identification based on the Cholesky 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR shocks. 
Following this matrix, the first ordered shock would not react contemporaneously to any 
shocks in the system. The second one reacts only to the first shock, and so on. The four-
variable VAR model equation has the following form: 


 1 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 0   1
 


 
 = 1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 1 00 0 0 1 

 				
,  (2) 
where g denotes the government expenditures, y the output, iT is the Income and wealth 
taxes revenue, and pT the tax revenue on Production and imports. Hence, the multiplier 
is given by 
∑ ∆ !∑ ∆(//)! . 
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Thus, imposing a set of quarterly exogenous shocks (1 s.d. innovation) and assessing the 
response of GDP, the fiscal multiplier will be computed as an accumulated change in 
output to a quarterly variation in the fiscal variable. 
4. Estimation and Results 
We used four different country sample settings in the estimations to assess the value of 
the fiscal multipliers, and to understand how they may vary according to specific factors. 
In the baseline estimation, for the period 2001Q1-2016Q4, the sample is composed by 
Eurozone countries (EA19) with a dummy variable to exclude the countries while they 
were out of the EMU. In a second stage, a dummy for high levels of public debt will be 
included, with a threshold of 60% of GDP, to split the countries with amounts under and 
above this value. The third one will be focus on the GDP growth, in order to perceive 
how the multipliers might vary depending if the countries are in expansions or in 
recessions. For simplification, it was considered the annual growth (equal in all quarters 
of each year) and the recessions was understood as an annual decrease in GDP. Finally, 
in a last estimation, it will be added a dummy for the output gap (gap between the current 
GDP and the potential GDP – annual data from AMECO), differentiating countries with 
an output gap under and above their potential GDP. 
The graphical representations of the impulse response functions are presented in the 
Appendix. 
4.1. Baseline Estimation 
 
Table 2 – Multiplier’s estimation of the baseline sample 
 
According to the results, the value of the primary expenditure (accumulated) multiplier is 
0.64 facing a quarterly shock, in the EA19 between 2000 and 2016. In other words, in 
SVAR
4 lags
Variable Characteristic Period (quarters) Multiplier
Primary Expenditure : 4 0.64
Primary Expenditure : 8 1.10
Income and Wealth Taxes : 4 -0.10
Income and Wealth Taxes : 8 -0.31
Production and Imports Taxes : 4 -0.32
Production and Imports Taxes : 8 -0.24
Fiscal Multipliers: +1 s.d. innovation shock
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response to a quarterly exogenous +1% shock in primary expenditure, the GDP is 
expected to increase 0.64% at the end of the first year (4 quarters). Moreover, the value 
is predicted to increase to 1.10 at the end of the second year. 
An 1% increase in the Income and wealth taxes’ revenue is supposed to have a 
recessionary impact on GDP of 0.10%, reaching 0.31% over 8 quarters. 
Regarding an increase in Production and imports taxes revenue, the multiplier is expected 
to be -0.32, but contrary to the remaining shocks, will decrease its value at the end of the 
second year (-0.24). 
One can also observe that primary expenditure has higher values for multipliers than 
taxes, showing a stronger impact on GDP, and appearing to be a more effective tool to 
deal with the business cycle. That could be explained by i) the direct impact on demand 
that an expenditure shock would generate, while a tax shock would be accommodated by 
a (lower than 1) price-demand elasticity, and ii) following the methodology applied, 
contrary to expenditure shocks, tax shocks do not have a contemporaneous impact on 
GDP. 
4.2. Debt-Dependent Estimation 
 
Table 3 – Multiplier’s estimation of the debt dependent sample 
 
SVAR
4 lags
Variable Characteristic Period (quarters) Multiplier
Primary Expenditure Debt > 60% 4 0.50
Primary Expenditure Debt > 60% 8 1.04
Primary Expenditure Debt < 60% 4 0.03
Primary Expenditure Debt < 60% 8 1.90
Income and Wealth Taxes Debt > 60% 4 -0.32
Income and Wealth Taxes Debt > 60% 8 -0.97
Income and Wealth Taxes Debt < 60% 4 0.24
Income and Wealth Taxes Debt < 60% 8 0.71
Production and Imports Taxes Debt > 60% 4 -0.60
Production and Imports Taxes Debt > 60% 8 -1.15
Production and Imports Taxes Debt < 60% 4 0.24
Production and Imports Taxes Debt < 60% 8 1.83
Fiscal Multipliers: +1 s.d. innovation shock
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Observing the results, it is observed that for countries with high levels of public debt, the 
primary expenditure multiplier is 0.51 (1.04 in the second year), the Income and wealth 
taxes multiplier is -0.32 (-0.97), and the Production and imports taxes is -0.6 (-1.15).  
In the opposite scenario, with countries with a public debt lower than 60% of GDP, 
although the primary expenditure seems to be close to zero at the end of the first year 
(0.03), it shifts to 1.90 at the end of the second one. The tax multipliers seem to have 
positive signs. Whilst in the first year, both Income and wealth and the Production and 
imports taxes have the same value for the multiplier, 0.24, in the second year, the values 
increase to 0.71 and 1.83, respectively.  
At least during the first year, the fiscal multipliers seems to be higher facing high levels 
of public debt since the effect on long-term interest rates is predicted to be higher 
(Spilimbergo et al, 2009) and the propensity to consume is higher under a liquidity 
constraint scenario (Brinca et al, 2016). 
4.3. Growth-Dependent Estimation 
 
 
The results show that the primary expenditure multiplier is higher during recessions than 
in expansions, achieving values above unity in the first year (1.28), and above two in the 
second one (2.39), which corroborates with some literature that points to a higher 
effectiveness of public expenditure during recessions (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 
2012). This might be understood due to a higher need of subsidies and transfers to agents 
with high levels of propensity to consume. In addition, while in an expansion, a 
SVAR
4 lags
Variable Characteristic Period (quarters) Multiplier
Primary Expenditure Expansion 4 0.17
Primary Expenditure Expansion 8 0.15
Primary Expenditure Recession 4 1.28
Primary Expenditure Recession 8 2.39
Income and Wealth Taxes Expansion 4 -0.21
Income and Wealth Taxes Expansion 8 -0.73
Income and Wealth Taxes Recession 4 -0.04
Income and Wealth Taxes Recession 8 -0.10
Production and Imports Taxes Expansion 4 -0.67
Production and Imports Taxes Expansion 8 -1.37
Production and Imports Taxes Recession 4 -0.17
Production and Imports Taxes Recession 8 -0.22
Fiscal Multipliers: +1 s.d. innovation shock
18 
 
hypothetical decrease in public expenditure would be offset by the increase in 
consumption and net exports, in a recession, the expenditure would have a higher effect 
on output, increasing the consumption and investment when net exports tend to decrease 
(Riera-Crichtion et al,2014). 
Contrary to the spending multipliers, the tax multipliers seem to generate a higher effect 
on GDP during expansions, where the Production and imports Taxes might have an 
impact over the unity in the end of the second year (-1.37). Once again, this type of taxes 
reveals stronger multipliers than the Income and wealth ones. 
Notice that, this result supporting the Keynesian theory, shows that the fiscal policy is 
more effective when applying countercyclical policies, increasing expenditure during bad 
times, and searching for higher tax revenues during expansions. 
Nevertheless, it is perceived that in the tables 4.2 and 4.3 that the impacts of quarterly 
fiscal shocks are substantially higher in highly indebted countries (at least in the first year) 
and the expenditure multiplier is much higher during recessions. That may call for a 
special attention concerning fiscal consolidations strategies (restrictive pro-cyclical 
policies) based in expenditure cuts, sometimes inherent to indebtedness processes. 
 
4.4. Output Gap-Dependent Estimation 
 
In countries when the outputs are above their potential GDP, i.e., when the output gap is 
positive, the primary expenditure multiplier is predicted to be, in average, 0.55, 
SVAR
4 lags
Variable Characteristic Period (quarters) Multiplier
Primary Expenditure OutputGap > 0% 4 0.55
Primary Expenditure OutputGap > 0% 8 0.41
Primary Expenditure OutputGap < 0% 4 0.42
Primary Expenditure OutputGap < 0% 8 0.77
Income and Wealth Taxes OutputGap > 0% 4 -0.35
Income and Wealth Taxes OutputGap > 0% 8 -0.54
Income and Wealth Taxes OutputGap < 0% 4 -0.02
Income and Wealth Taxes OutputGap < 0% 8 -0.22
Production and Imports Taxes OutputGap > 0% 4 -0.50
Production and Imports Taxes OutputGap > 0% 8 -0.08
Production and Imports Taxes OutputGap < 0% 4 -0.02
Production and Imports Taxes OutputGap < 0% 8 0.44
Fiscal Multipliers: +1 s.d. innovation shock
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diminishing it accumulated response until the end of the second year to 0.41. Regarding 
the tax multipliers, the Income and wealth one has an annual multiplier of -0.35 (-0.54) 
and in the Production and imports taxes the multiplier is higher, -0.5, but decreases 
significantly in the second year to -0.08. 
In turn, countries with negative output gaps seem to have lower multipliers. The primary 
expenditure multiplier stood in 0.42 (0.77 in the second year), and for both the taxes 
multipliers it was estimated a multiplier of just -0.02 in the first year. Nevertheless, 
although the Income and wealth one increases in the second year to -0.22, the Production 
and imports taxes multiplier (perceived by a positive shock in revenue) appear to have a 
hardly understood expansionary value of 0.44.   
5. Conclusions 
According to the literature, the uncertainty and the non-linear responses of fiscal stimulus 
during the Great Recession has brought the sign and magnitude of fiscal multipliers into 
debate. Thus, this study intended to compute the value of fiscal multipliers, namely of 
government expenditure, Income and wealth and production and import taxes, in the 
Eurozone countries since the creation of the currency union. In addition, it was our aim 
to understand how those values may vary according to the level of public debt, the rhythm 
of economic growth and the output gap. 
After sharing some contributions in the literature regarding the fiscal multipliers and the 
underlying theories, we conclude that, according to our estimations, during the period 
2000-2016 the government expenditure had a positive effect on output, with an annual 
accumulated multiplier of 0.64 (1.10 after two years). The tax multipliers presented 
negative signs, in which the Income and wealth and the production and import taxes stood 
at -0.10 (-0.31) and -0.32 (-0.24), respectively.  
Furthermore, for countries with high levels of public debt, the computed primary 
expenditure multiplier is 0.51, the Income and wealth tax multiplier is -0.32, and for the 
Production and imports taxes is -0.6, while with a public debt lower than 60% of GDP, 
the annual multiplier of primary expenditure seem to be close to zero (0.03) and the tax 
multipliers seem to have positive signs. The results shown that in the first year, both 
Income and wealth and the Production and imports taxes have the same value for the 
multiplier, 0.24. The difference between multipliers depending on the debt level might 
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has to do with the effect on long-term interest rates and the propensity to consume under 
a liquidity constraint scenario. 
In addition, the primary expenditure multiplier seems to be higher during recessions than 
in expansions, achieving values above unity in the first year (1.28 comparing with 0.17 
of expansions), reflecting the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers and supporting the 
Keynesian theory, where the fiscal policy is expected to be more effective when applying 
countercyclical policies. In the other hand, the tax multipliers seem to generate a higher 
effect on GDP during expansions, where the Production and imports taxes reveals 
stronger multipliers than the Income and wealth ones. 
Lastly, countries with negative output gaps presented lower multipliers. The primary 
expenditure multiplier is predicted to be, in average, 0.42 (0.55 when positive) and for 
both taxes, it was estimated a multiplier of just -0.02 in the first year. When the output 
gap is positive, the Income and wealth multiplier is -0.35 and for Production and imports 
taxes is -0.50. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
 
 
Appendix B – Graphic Representation of the Estimations2 
Baseline Estimation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Shock1: 1 S.D. innovation in the logarithm of Primary Expenditure; 
Shock3: 1 S.D. innovation in the logarithm of Income and wealth taxes revenue (in differences); 
Shock4: 1 S.D. innovation in the logarithm of Production and imports taxes revenue (in differences). 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Kurtosis Observ.
GDP 25869.89 23243.31 83312.79 3157.75 15447.27 6.59 1292
Primary Expenditure 11001.61 9281.19 34560.62 694.56 6760.20 5.21 1256
Income and Wealth Taxes 3054.44 2285.14 12497.11 155.40 2353.46 5.89 1256
Poduction and Imports Taxes 3276.25 2913.73 10845.64 259.80 1917.74 6.58 1256
Debt 61.61 59.70 181.00 3.30 36.13 3.13 1289
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Accumulated Response of LN_GDP to Shock1
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Accumulated Response of LN_GDP to Shock3
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Accumulated Response of LN_GDP to Shock4
24 
 
Debt-Dependent Estimation 
 
Public Debt > 60% of GDP 
 
 
 
Public Debt < 60% of GDP 
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Growth-Dependent Estimation 
 
GDP Growth < 0% 
 
 
 
GDP Growth > 0% 
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Output Gap-Dependent Estimation 
 
Output Gap < 0% Potential GDP 
  
 
 
 
Output Gap > 0% Potential GDP 
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Appendix C – VAR Stability Condition Check 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
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